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In human cognition, measures of how one indi-
vidual differs from another frequently fall into two
broad categories: general aptitude testing and
speciﬁc clinical testing. General aptitude tests such
as IQ tests and the SAT effectively capture the full
range of performance, from exceptionally good to
clinically poor, yet they tend to be aimed at only a
few, general abilities. In contrast, clinical tests are
available for a diverse array of speciﬁc disabilities.
However,sinceclinicaltestsareaimedatidentifying
clinicallypoorperformance,theytendtoberelatively
insensitive to variation in the nonimpaired range.
Could it be that our concerted efforts to capture
general abilities and speciﬁc disabilities have missed
an opportunity to capture the full range of perform-
ance in numerous speciﬁc abilities that deﬁne key
aspects of our individuality? In this paper, we take
face recognition ability as an example of a speciﬁc
ability that can contribute to our understanding of
what makes each individual unique.
Weviewthespeciﬁcityoffacerecognitionability
as a potentially paradigmatic example of how our
increased understanding of neural and cognitive
mechanisms can guide a renewed search for speciﬁc
abilities. Face recognition is one of the clearest
examples of a neurally and cognitively dissociable
trait. Several brain areas respond more strongly to
faces than to other stimuli (Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Tsao, Freiwald,
Tootell, & Livingstone, 2006; Tsao, Moeller, &
Freiwald, 2008), several behavioural phenomena
are larger for faces than for other stimuli (McKone,
Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007), and studies of
patients and transcranial magnetic stimulation have
shown both selective impairments in, and selective
sparing of, face processing (Duchaine, Yovel,
Butterworth, & Nakayama, 2006; Germine,
Cashdollar, Du ¨zel, & Duchaine, 2011;
Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997;
Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine,
2009). Such dissociations identify face recognition
as a promising candidate for possible speciﬁcity.
We demonstrate here that face recognition
fractionates from other domains not only in exper-
imental and patient-based studies, but also in its
natural variation across individuals. Indeed, face
recognition appears to be largely independent of,
or speciﬁc from, more general abilities (see Table 1,
which presents key criteria, terms, and heuristics
related to capturing speciﬁc abilities). This speci-
ﬁcity implies a relative commonness of both selec-
tive deﬁcits and selective talents in the domain of
face recognition.
The discovery of new speciﬁc abilities could
provide an opportunity to reexamine a classic ques-
tion in human ability research: To what extent do
human abilities cluster into fewer general abilities
versus multiple speciﬁc abilities? In the past, a
tension has existed between the intuitive appeal
and popularity of theories that emphasize a
larger number of more diverse abilities (Gardner,
1983; Goleman, 1998; Guilford, 1967;
Sternberg, 1984; Thorndike, 1920) and the
clearer and more rigorous empirical support for
theories that emphasize a smaller number of
more overlapping abilities (Chabris, 2007; Jensen
& Weng, 1994; Neisser et al., 1996; Spearman,
1904; cf. Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Mayer,
Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). A rigorous characteriz-
ation of new speciﬁc abilities could conceivably
show that popular intuitions about the multiplicity
of our cognitive strengths and weaknesses are not
as far from reality as prior work has suggested.
Anotablefalsestartintheprocessofidentifying
face recognition as a speciﬁc ability was the release
of the third edition of the Wechsler Memory Scale
(WMS–III) in 1997 (Wechsler, 1997). A test of
face recognition was added to WMS–III in an
effort to capture nonverbal visual memory
(Holdnack & Dellis, 2004). Yet this face recog-
nition test was criticized as having an inadequate
correlation with the nonface visual memory
portion of WMS (r ¼ .28 to .30; Holdnack &
Dellis, 2004; Millis, Malina, Bowers, & Ricker,
1999; Wechsler, 1997) and was subsequently
dropped from the next version of WMS, WMS–
IV (Wechsler, 2009). Unknowingly, this research
anticipates our own result, reported below, of a
similarly low correlation between our face recog-
nition test (Cambridge Face Memory Test,
CFMT) and our nonface visual memory test
(Abstract Art Memory Test, AAMT; r ¼ .26).
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of our current aim to identify speciﬁc abilities and
more fully appreciate what makes each individual
unique, it was a disappointment in the context
of Wechsler’s aim to develop a more general
measure of visual memory. It is interesting to con-
sider how many more such ﬁndings, suggestive of
speciﬁc abilities, may be buried in the ﬁle drawers
of efforts to produce standardized general aptitude
tests.
Despite the heavy attention to faces in past
experimental studies of mind and brain, we still
know relatively little about individual differences
in face processing. This imbalance illustrates a
classic and persisting hurdle in psychology: the
difﬁculty of translating insights gleaned from
experiments into an understanding of naturally
occurring differences (Cronbach, 1957; Tracy,
Robins, & Sherman, 2009). We believe that pre-
dominantly experimental ﬁelds, such as cognitive
neuroscience, vision science, and experimental
psychology, have much to offer the study of
human variation. Yet the challenges of this trans-
lational work must not be taken lightly. In particu-
lar, increased attention to developing excellent
measures of human variation in experimentally
deﬁned mechanisms will be necessary to actualize
this translational potential.
Here, we provide a foundational analysis of the
full range of variation in face identity recognition
Table 1. Key criteria, terms, and heuristics related to capturing speciﬁc abilities
Summary phrase Details
Five key criteria for isolating and
measuring speciﬁc abilities
Isolating:
1. Clear theory of process or domain
2. High reliability
3. Established convergent and discriminant validity
Measuring:
4. Extensive norms
5. Detailed, model-based analysis of ability and precision
Speciﬁc ability An ability that is largely independent of more general abilities, of which psychometric
intelligence, or g, is the most general (Spearman, 1931, interview transcribed in
Deary, Lawn, & Bartholomew, 2008).
Precision The precision of an estimate of performance, or ability, may be deﬁned by its standard
error of measurement: The smaller the standard error of measurement, the higher
the precision. Precision and reliability are essentially equivalent concepts (Lord &
Novick, 1968).
Convergent validity A pattern of higher correlations with more theoretically related measures or
manipulations (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Discriminant validity A pattern of lowercorrelationswith lesstheoretically related measures or manipulations
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Correlation’s “upper bound” The theoretical upper bound on the correlation between two measures is computed as
the geometric mean of their reliabilities (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996).
Remote association The best evidence for convergent validity comes from a “remote association”, or a
sizeable correlation with a test designed to capture the mechanism of interest in a
rather different way (Wilmer, 2008).
Proximal dissociation The best evidence for discriminant validity comes from a “proximal dissociation”, or a
low correlation with a test designed to capture a similar process or domain in a
similar way (Wilmer, 2008).
“Sweet spot” for item difﬁculty All else equal, items that show the highest item correlations, and therefore contribute
most to reliability, tend to have a difﬁculty about midway between perfect
performance and chance performance (Lord & Novick, 1968). Yet though items
near the sweet spot tend to contribute the most to reliability, a range of difﬁculties is
still generally preferred when the aim is to precisely capture individual performance
over a broad range of ability levels.
362 Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6)
WILMER ET AL.ability. This paper centres around ﬁve key test
development criteria that we propose as a core
methodology for isolating and measuring speciﬁc
abilities. These criteria are detailed in the next
section. In subsequent sections, we apply each cri-
terion to face recognition ability in a manner that
aims to be accessible and broadly applicable to
further investigations of speciﬁc abilities.
By applying the ﬁrst three of our ﬁve criteria, we
isolate face recognition as a speciﬁc ability, building
offoftheWMSﬁndingsrecountedaboveandother
more recent reports suggesting speciﬁcity (Dennett
et al., 2012; Hildebrandt, Wilhelm, Schmiedek,
Herzmann, & Sommer, 2011; McGugin, Richler,
Herzmann, Speegle, & Gauthier, 2012; Wilhelm
et al., 2010; Wilmer et al., 2010). By applying the
ﬁnal two criteria, we enhance the measurement of
face recognition ability, ﬁrst by establishing tra-
ditional age- and sex-referenced norms, then by
generating model-based estimates of ability and
precision for each individual. Notably, by consider-
ing these precision estimates en masse over our 14
hundred participants, we are able to characterize
the precision of our measures over the full range
of ability levels, from clinically poor to exceptionally
good. Finally, by providing our entire normative
data set as supplementary information, we enable
future researchers to generate the same norm-
referenced and model-based estimates for their
participants.
We measure face recognition ability here with
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT,
Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), which has been
used, to date, in over 50 published studies.
CFMT’s clear instructions and computer-based
format make it quick, uncomplicated, and suitable
for web administration, where it has produced
results indistinguishable from lab testing
(Germine et al., 2012; Wilmer et al., 2010).
CFMT’s effective removal of nonface cues is sup-
ported by both its robust inversion effect and its
effective identiﬁcation of prosopagnosic individ-
uals—those with severe everyday face recognition
deﬁcits (Bowles et al., 2009; Duchaine &
Nakayama, 2006). While CFMT was initially
developed as a diagnostic test for developmental
prosopagnosia (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006), a
domain in which it has become the de facto
standard instrument (Bowles et al., 2009), CFMT
hasincreasinglybeenusedinstudiesthatinvestigate
the full range of human variation. Evidence has
accumulated for CFMT’s reliability (Bowles et al.,
2009; Herzmann, Danthiir, Schacht, Sommer, &
Wilhelm, 2008; Wilmer et al., 2010) and validity
(Bowles et al., 2009; Dennett et al., 2012; Russell,
Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009; Wilmer et al.,
2010) for capturing individual differences and also
for the heritability of CFMT-measured individual
differences in face recognition (Wilmer et al.,
2010). Several additional tests have recently
been modelled after CFMT (Dennett et al.,
2012; Germine, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2011;
McGugin et al., 2012; McKone et al., 2011;
McKone et al., 2012).
We include two key control recognition tests in
our investigation: (a) an Abstract Art Memory
Test (AAMT) of visual memory for hard-to-
verbalize images (Wilmer et al., 2010), and (b) a
Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test (VPMT)
of verbal memory for hard-to-visualize word
pairs (Woolley, Gerbasi, Chabris, Kosslyn, &
Hackman, 2008). Like CFMT, AAMT and
VPMT have produced highly comparable results
on the web and in the lab (Germine et al., 2012).
AAMT and VPMT were chosen to enable a
clean dissociation of face recognition from more
general visual and verbal recognition abilities.
Moreover, AAMT and VPMT examine abilities
that face recognition is often intuitively grouped
with. AAMT assesses visual recognition of
stimuli that, like faces, are difﬁcult to describe
verbally. VPMT assesses verbal recognition of
word pairs that, like the names we attach to
faces, create an arbitrary association between a
word and something else (here, that “something
else” is a second word, in order to minimize the
involvement of visual memory). The theoretical
basis, reliability, and validity we establish below
for these key control tests is an important step in
demonstrating the speciﬁcity of face recognition.
A canonical constraint in test development is the
costoftestingmanyindividuals.Numerousiterative
improvements are often required for a test to
achieve adequate usability, efﬁciency, reliability,
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6) 363
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process, which in the past has often relied upon in-
person assessment of many thousands of paid par-
ticipants, can be extremely costly. Such an obstacle
can be overcome where proﬁt incentive is great
(e.g., by private corporations), but it can otherwise
be prohibitive. The potential for proﬁt is clearly
substantial for many general aptitude tests, such as
IQ tests and the Scholastic Assessment Test
(SAT), and for manyclinical tests designed to diag-
nose common speciﬁc disabilities, such as tests for
dyslexia or aphasia. We propose that there is less
proﬁt incentive for tests of speciﬁc abilities,
despite the broad value to society of a more indivi-
dualized understanding of human performance and
potential. The case of face recognition in the
Wechsler Memory Scale, recounted above, may be
ac a s ei np o i n t .
Our present approach to this obstacle rests on
the following insight: By providing real-time, indi-
vidualized feedback on performance, web-based
testing can satisfy an individual’s desire for self-
knowledge while producing high-quality scientiﬁc
data (Germine et al., 2012; Wilmer et al., 2010).
Such an approach aligns the interests of individuals
withthoseofscienceandproducesthelargeamount
of high-quality data necessary for rigorous test
development.Webelievethereispotential fora vir-
tuous circle of learning whereby the public’s direct
engagementin the creationof new scientiﬁc knowl-
edge facilitates science’s efforts to enhance individ-
uals’ self-knowledge. As a model example of this
approach, the bulk of the analyses reported in this
paper use a 1,471-participant data set collected via
our website Testmybrain.org. We include this
entire, item-by-item data set as supplementary
information to ﬂexibly support further research
efforts with the three main tests reported on here
(CFMT, AAMT, and VPMT).
In sum, the present investigation isolates and
measures the speciﬁc ability of face recognition.
To do so, it applies the power of modern
psychometric methods and web-based testing to
hypotheses generated from basic cognitive and
neuroscience research. Motivated by this
example, we suggest that the time is right for a
renewed investigation of speciﬁc abilities.
FIVE CRITERIA FOR ISOLATING
AND MEASURING SPECIFIC
ABILITIES
We now summarize the ﬁve test development cri-
teria that we use below to isolate (Criteria 1–3)
and measure (Criteria 4–5) face recognition
ability. Following this summary, we apply each
of these criteria to our battery of three tests
(CFMT, AAMT, and VPMT). By applying the
ﬁrst three criteria, we provide clear evidence for
the speciﬁcity of face recognition ability. By apply-
ing the ﬁnal two criteria, we (a) enable the gener-
ation of two types of standardized scores for our
tests, (b) evaluate the precision of our tests over
their full range, and (c) allow the generation of
unique error bars for each individual’s score.
Criterion 1. Clear theory of process or
domain
Any test should have clear rationale for what it is
designed to measure. The targeted capacity could
be a particular process across domains, such as recog-
nition memoryregardless ofwhat istoberecognized.
It could be a particular domain across processes, such
as face processing regardless of what type of proces-
sing is to be done on the face. Or, it could be a par-
ticular process in a particular domain, such as face
identity recognition. In Section 1, we lay out, for
each of our tests, the underlying theory, details on
its development, and its procedure.
Criterion 2. High reliability
Classic test theory seeks to maximize global
reliability measures, such as Cronbach’s alpha or
Guttman’s lambda, that provide an estimate of
overall signal-to-noise in the measure. Such esti-
mates are critical for interpreting the size of corre-
lations, since the geometric mean of the reliabilities of
two measures provides a theoretical upper bound on
the correlation that may be obtained between them
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1996). In Section 2,
we observe high reliability for our three tests
and conduct item analyses to develop a more
364 Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6)
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each item to the reliability of the test as a whole.
Criterion 3. Established convergent and
discriminant validity
A valid test measures what it is designed to
measure. Validity is generally deﬁned by a pattern
of higher correlations with more theoretically related
measures or manipulations (convergent validity) and
lower correlations with less theoretically related
measures or manipulations (discriminant validity;
Campbell & Fiske, 1959). A valid measure of a
speciﬁc ability will show particularly acute discrimi-
nant validity, dissociating strongly from more
general ability measures theorized to involve
similar processes, similar domains, or both similar
processes and similar domains. In Section 3, we
ﬁrst document the convergent validity of our three
tests (CFMT, AAMT, and VPMT). We then
show that CFMT dissociates strongly from both
AAMT and VPMT despite their reliability, their
convergent validity, and their focus on the puta-
tively similar process of recognition memory.
These dissociations show that face recognition, as
assessed by CFMT, is a speciﬁc ability.
Criterion 4. Extensive norms
Norms enable the interpretation of an individual’s
score by deﬁning a reference distribution with
which that score can be compared. A larger and
richer normative data set can be used to more ﬁnely
match the reference distribution to a given individ-
ual’s age, sex, or other characteristics. Providing the
entire data set directly in open-access form, as we
do here, rather than just summary statistics, enables
the richest and most ﬂexible comparisons. In
Section4,weintroduceour1,471participantnorma-
tive data set and characterize variation in perform-
ance by age and sex.
Criterion 5. Detailed, model-based analysis
of ability and precision
Item response theory (IRT) calculates ability in a
model-based manner that goes beyond simply
summing performance over test items. IRT
scores include precision, in the form of unique
standard error bars, for each individual, something
that raw scores do not provide. These individual
error bars facilitate clinical decision making.
They may also be looked at en masse to
characterize the overall precision of a measurement
tool over different ranges of performance. Finally,
IRT scores are less tied to the particular normative
sample that was used to compute them than are
traditional z scores. In Section 5, we present a
minitutorial on IRT analyses. We then conduct
IRT analyses on our three tests. The item-by-item
data set we provide as supplementary information
can be used to calculate IRT-based ability and
precision estimates for any further individual who
takes one or more of these tests.
SECTION 1: CLEAR THEORY OF
PROCESS OR DOMAIN
Any test should have a clear theory for what it is
designed to measure. It could be designed to
measure a particular process across domains, a par-
ticular domain across processes, or a particular
process in a particular domain. Face recognition
ability is an example of a particular process in a
particular domain, with recognition being the
process and faces being the domain.
Such a clear theory is needed not only for tests
of a candidate speciﬁc ability, but also for the
control tests that are used to evaluate that speci-
ﬁcity. Our two control tests were chosen to
enable a clean dissociation of face recognition
from abilities similar in process (recognition
memory) but different in domain (involving
nonface visual and difﬁcult-to-visualize verbal
stimuli). As mentioned above, these control
tests measure recognition abilities that face rec-
ognition is often intuitively grouped with: (a)
An Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT) assesses
visual recognition of stimuli that, like faces, are
difﬁcult to describe verbally, and (b) a Verbal
Paired-Associates Memory Test (VPMT)
assesses verbal recognition of word pairs that,
like the names we attach to faces, create an
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6) 365
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something else (here, that “something else” is a
second word, in order to minimize the involve-
ment of visual memory).
In this section, we describe the theory behind
each of our tests, as well as each test’s
development, implementation, and procedure.
The basic procedure for all three of our tests,
shown in Figure 1, involves ﬁrst presenting the
participant with a series of stimuli to learn (“learn-
ing phase”) and then asking them to recognize
these stimuli amongst distractors in a multiple-
Figure 1. Schematicdescription of three mainmemory tests. In the learningphase, shown at left, theparticipant learns novel targetstimuli. In
the test phase, shown at right, the participant identiﬁes the target stimulus amongst distractors. See text for details of each test. Stimuli shown
in a and b are different from, but chosen to be representative of, those used in the actual tests. To view a colour version of this ﬁgure, please see
the online issue of the Journal.
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thus designed to assess recognition memory for
novel, recently encountered stimuli.
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT)
CFMT was designed to be a relatively pure test of
face memory that measures the ability to learn a
novel face, without involving features that are a
nonintrinsic part of the face, such as hair, make-
up, or jewellery (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006).
The detailed structure, motivation, and develop-
ment of the Cambridge Face Memory Test is
described in Duchaine and Nakayama (2006).
A graphical summary of the basic structure of
CFMT is shown in Figure 1a. CFMT uses a
three-alternative forced choice (3AFC) recog-
nition paradigm, so chance performance is 33%
correct. In an initial learning block of 18 trials,
participants view each of six faces from three
different viewpoints, and after seeing the three
views for a given face (Figure 1a, left), they are
given three test trials for that face (one example
test trial shown in the ﬁrst row of Figure 1a,
right). In a second block of 30 trials, participants
are tested on their ability to remember the six
target faces in novel images from various view-
points (Figure 1a, right, second row). A third
block of 24 trials again tests participants on their
ability to remember the target faces in novel
images from various viewpoints, but adds visual
noise (Figure 1a, third row). In between blocks,
participants study a line-up of all six faces, simul-
taneously presented, for 30 seconds.
It is worth noting that CFMT is unique
amongst our three tests in its inclusion of test
trials during the learning block. Performance on
these trials is typically above 95% correct. These
trials therefore contribute relatively little to discri-
minating better from worse performance on
CFMT. Rationales for having these trials include
(a) boosting the morale of those who may
perform poorly on the rest of the test (CFMT
was originally developed as a clinical test to ident-
ify developmental prosopagnosic patients) and (b)
reinforcing the learning process (learning of faces
is notoriously challenging, relative to other
stimulus classes; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006).
As we see below, some of these Block 1 items
also discriminate well between relatively low-per-
forming individuals, thereby contributing to
CFMT’s utility as a diagnostic test for poor face
recognition ability.
Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT)
AAMT was designed to be a relatively pure test of
visual memory that would measure individual
differences in learning of visual images without
unduly involving verbal processing or semantic
knowledge (Chatterjee, Russell & Nakayama,
2009). The stimulus images used in AAMT were
abstract images without any identiﬁable object or
obvious semantic content—essentially images
that were hard to verbalize, as faces are in the
absence of a name.
We wanted a relatively pure measure of visual
memory for novel, nonface stimuli. We chose
abstract art as the stimulus category to make the
test sufﬁciently challenging, to reduce the useful-
ness of verbal strategies, and to minimize the
impact of speciﬁc semantic knowledge or other
forms of expertise by minimizing dependence on
prior knowledge of known objects. Abstract art
is an uncommon category to have substantial
expertise in, and due to its abstract nature, it is
nonobvious that such expertise would aid
memory, short of direct prior experience with
the speciﬁc items to be remembered. Indeed,
abstract art eschews, by deﬁnition, physical
realism, semantic information, and simple categ-
orization, and, contrary to most object classes, it
tends not to share common organizational fea-
tures. In contrast, individual differences in visual
expertise can be ubiquitous for more semantically
loaded stimulus classes such as cars (Dennett
et al., 2012). These individual differences in
visual expertise for a speciﬁc stimulus category
of personal interest may obscure broader and
more fundamental individual differences in
nonface visual memory.
A graphical summary of the basic structure of
AAMT is shown in Figure 1b. AAMT uses a
3AFC recognition paradigm, so chance
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6) 367
SPECIFIC ABILITIESperformance is 33% correct. During the learning
phase (Figure 1b, left), participants study a series
of 50 abstract art images, each presented for one
second, with a one-second blank screen between
images. During the subsequent test phase (Figure
1b, right), participants are asked to identify each
memorized image amongst two novel images.
Each previously viewed image is tested once, for
50 total trials. A short practice was given at the
beginning, with two images memorized and then
tested. The images were multicolour. Each image
was cropped into a square of the same size. The
order of target images in the testing phase is
random with respect to the order of target images
in the learning phase, but the order of images in
the learning phase, and the order of trials in the
test phase, are both the same across participants.
In an initial piloting phase, we used a version of
the test that contained 100 rather than 50 images.
Based on pilot data, we honed the test to a more
efﬁcient 50-item version that retained a high
level of reliability and aimed mean performance
at 66% accuracy, midway between chance and
ceiling (see Sections 2 and 5 and Table 1 above
for discussions of how this midway point tends
to relate to reliability and precision).
Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test
(VPMT)
VPMT (ﬁrst used by Woolley et al., 2008) was
designed to be a relatively pure test of verbal
memory that would measure individual differences
in episodic verbal memory without involving
visual–spatial processing.
A graphical summary of the basic structure of
VPMT is shown in Figure 1c. VPMT uses a
four-alternative forced choice (4AFC) recognition
paradigm, so chance performance is 25% correct.
During the learning phase (Figure 1c, left), partici-
pants study a series of 25 word pairs, each presented
for six seconds. During the subsequent test phase
(Figure 1c, right), participants view the ﬁrst word
in each pair, along with four alternative candidates
for the second word, and are asked to select the
one that was in the original pair they studied.
In order to make the test difﬁcult (it was
initially designed to identify extraordinary perfor-
mers in Woolley et al., 2008) and to reduce the
usefulness of visual–spatial strategies (a desirable
quality for isolating verbal recognition with
minimal contribution of visual processing), only
abstract nouns were used. Paivio (1965) showed
that paired associate learning is signiﬁcantly
worse for abstract word pairs than for concrete
word pairs. Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan’s (1968)
norms for concreteness and imagery of nouns
were used to select a set of 100 abstract nouns
with low concreteness and imageability ratings
(e.g., “hope”) that were not also extremely uncom-
mon. These words were then randomly separated
into four lists of 25 words, two destined to be
cues and two destined to be targets. As semantic
similarity can signiﬁcantly aid memory (Howard
& Kahana, 2002), cues and targets were matched
to minimize semantic relatedness (using latent
semantic analysis) and to avoid matching words
that started with the same letter or ended with
the same letter string (e.g., no “-tion” words
were paired). For each cue–target pair, three dis-
tractor words were chosen from the other possible
target words in the same list. The distractor words
were randomly chosen, with the constraints that
each word appeared as a target word once, and
three times as a distractor word, and the three dis-
tractor words were different from one another on
every trial. Two versions of the test (Forms A
and B) were thus prepared, each with a unique
set of word pairs. Form A was used here. The ver-
sions were approximately equal in word and word-
pair ratings.
The six-second presentation of word pairs
during the learning phase was slightly longer
than the most typical duration (ﬁve seconds)
found in the literature because the abstractness
and unrelatedness of the words in the pairs had
already made the test more difﬁcult than typical
versions. The word pairs in the learning phase
and the trials in the test phase were presented in
a single predetermined random order. The order
of the 25 test trials, one for each memorized
word pair, was unrelated to the order of word
pairs in the study phase). In the data reported in
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CFMT was administered between VPMT’s learn-
ing phase and test phase, which made VPMT’s test
phase more difﬁcult.
SECTION 2: HIGH RELIABILITY
Measuring reliability is necessary for interpreting
the magnitude of correlations between tests.
Optimizing efﬁciency is one of the fundamental
aims of classic test theory; if higher reliability can
be achieved from shorter tests, measurement
error is reduced, statistical power enhanced, and
inferences strengthened. In this section, we focus
ﬁrst on measuring reliability and then on evaluat-
ing efﬁciency.
Our ﬁrst analysis below measures the reliability
of our three tests and ﬁnds them all to be high by
conventionalstandards.Oursecondanalysis,astan-
dard item analysis, provides a window into the con-
tribution of individual items to the reliability of
each test. Such item analyses can guide efforts to
add and drop items in order to increase a test’s
reliability and/or its efﬁciency. The results of
these item analyses suggest that while incremental
improvements in efﬁciency may still be possible,
these tests are already quite efﬁcient.
Our third analysis, a modiﬁed item analysis,
illustrates the limitations of a standard item analy-
sis by showing that some items discriminate better
at lower ability levels, while other items discrimi-
nate better at higher ability levels. When aiming
for a test that captures performance across the
full range of abilities, as we advocate here, it is
helpful to choose a variety of items, some that dis-
criminate well at lower ability levels and some that
discriminate well at higher ability levels. This
modiﬁed item analysis provides a bridge to
Section 5. The IRT analyses we conduct in that
section explicitly model performance on each
item by ability level. These IRT analyses ulti-
mately allow a more principled estimate of ability
that includes unique error bars for each person.
All three analyses reported in this section were
computed using the 1,471-person normative data
set described in Section 4, which is provided as
supplementary materials.
Analysis 1: Reliability
The reliability of a test directly limits the size of its
correlations with other tests. For example, if two
measures each have a reliability of .5, the theoreti-
cal upper bound on their correlation with each
other is .5. More generally, the theoretical upper
bound on the correlation between two measures is
computed as the geometric mean of their reliabilities
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1996). Correlations scale
proportionally with this upper bound. For
example, the same underlying relationship that
produces a .2 correlation with an upper bound of
.4 would be expected to produce a .3 correlation
with an upper bound of .6 and a .5 correlation if
it were possible for the upper bound to reach 1.0
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1996). Tests of the signiﬁ-
cance of the difference between two correlations
implicitly assume that the upper bounds on these
correlations are the same. If upper bounds differ
between two correlations, then this should be
taken into account when comparing them
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1996).
Several basic approaches exist for measuring
reliability, each capturing somewhat different
potential sources of measurement noise. Here,
we focus on internal reliability, which assesses
the noise present even within a single adminis-
tration of the test. To visualize the reliability of
our three tests, we plot in Figures 2a–2c the per-
formance of each individual on even trials
(y-axis) against their performance on odd trials
(x-axis). For all three tests, performance on odd
trials is clearly highly predictive of performance
on even trials. The correlations shown here imply
Spearman–Brown corrected split-half reliabilities
of .91, .80, and .83 for CFMT, AAMT, and
VPMT, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha
reliabilities for these three tests—interpretable as
the mean of all possible Spearman–Brown cor-
rected split-half reliabilities (Cortina, 1993)—are
.90, .80, and .81 for CFMT, AAMT, and
VPMT, respectively. These internal reliabilities
are high by conventional standards, reaching or
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SPECIFIC ABILITIESFigure 2. Reliability and item analyses. Split-half correlations (left column), standard item analyses (middle column), and modiﬁed item
analyses (right column) for the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; top row), an Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT; middle row),
and a Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test (VPMT; bottom row), plotted with data from the normative sample described in Section
4. Graphs A–C plot the relationship between the two halves of each test (even items on y-axis plotted against odd items on x-axis). In
these graphs, the line shown plots x ¼ y. Graphs D–F plot results of a standard item analysis. In these graphs, item correlations (y-axis;
correlation between item and rest of test) are plotted against item difﬁculty (x-axis; proportion of persons answering that item
incorrectly). The horizontal lines in Graphs D–F indicate statistical signiﬁcance (p ¼ .05, two-tailed), and the vertical lines indicate
the midway point between ceiling and chance performance (the so-called psychometric sweet spot; see text). Different dot shades in Graph
D indicate CFMT’s Blocks 1 (light grey), 2 (dark grey), and 3 (black). Graphs G–I show results of a modiﬁed item analysis, designed to
highlight how a single item can discriminate differently at different ability levels. Graphs G–I are in most ways identical to Graphs D–
E; the x-axis is the same, and the y-axis is also the same except that performance on the rest of the test is dichotomized at a given
percentile cut-off (this focuses the analysis on the ability level represented by that percentile cut-off). Axis ranges in all Graphs D–I are
the same.
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of high-stakes tests (DeVellis, 1991).
Analysis 2: Standard item analysis
All else equal, adding items increases, and drop-
ping items decreases, a test’s reliability. Test devel-
opment typically involves some combination of
adding and dropping items to balance the desire
for high reliability with the desire for constrained
test length. Item analyses provide useful guidance
for such efforts.
A standard item analysis technique is to corre-
late performance on each item with summed per-
formance on the remainder of the test. We call
these correlation values “item correlations”. An
item correlation provides a rough measure of an
item’s contribution to test reliability. Figures 2d–
2f show item correlations for each of our three
tests (y-axis), arrayed by item difﬁculty (x-axis).
Item difﬁculty is deﬁned here as the proportion
of persons who answered an item incorrectly. We
now examine Figures 2d–2f in some detail to
evaluate the contributions of their individual
items to their reliability.
A basic aim for a test designed to measure a
single ability is for as many items as possible to
show a robust, positive item correlation, indicating
that they contribute nonzero information to the
measurement being made. In Figures 2d–2f, all
items on all three tests satisfy this aim by
showing positive item correlations that are above
the threshold for statistical signiﬁcance (threshold
of p ¼ .05, two-tailed, indicated by horizontal
dotted line). An item can, however, contain
nonzero positive information about an ability,
yet also contain enough noise with respect to
that ability that it has no overall effect on reliability
(or it could even reduce reliability). A case in point
is provided by Block 1 of CFMT, shown as the
light-grey dots in Figure 2d. While all item corre-
lations for this block are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, CFMT’s reliability is essentially
equally high with or without these items included
(e.g., Cronbach’s alpha with these items ¼ .90;
Cronbach’s without these items ¼ .89).
In many cases, evidence against a contribution
to reliability of one or several items justiﬁes short-
ening the test by dropping those items from the
test. The items in CFMT’s Block 1, however,
serve two purposes that are unrelated to issues of
reliability. First, as discussed in Section 1 above,
they are designed to reinforce the learning
process and to maintain morale for individuals
who go on to perform poorly on the rest of the
test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). Second, as
we discuss just below in Analysis 3, some of
these items distinguish relatively well at the low
end of performance. The case of CFMT’s Block
1, therefore, illustrates the importance of balan-
cing potentially multiple theory-driven and data-
driven considerations when making decisions
about dropping or adding items.
A general trend amongst item correlations is
evident for all tests, but especially for CFMT,
when item correlations are arrayed by item difﬁ-
culty, as in Figures 2d–2f. All else equal, items
that show the highest item correlations, and therefore
contribute most to reliability, tend to have a difﬁculty
about midway between perfect performance and
chance performance (Lord & Novick, 1968). For
three-alternative forced-choice tests like CFMT
and AAMT, where perfect performance is 0%
incorrect (100% correct), and chance performance
is 67% incorrect (33% correct), this so-called sweet
spot of difﬁculty is 33% incorrect (67% correct).
From a psychometric perspective, a mean item dif-
ﬁculty near the sweet spot is generally a desirable
quality in a test. Yet though items near the sweet
spot tend to contribute the most to reliability, a
range of difﬁculties is still generally preferred when
the aim is to precisely capture individual performance
over a broad range of ability levels. The reason for
this is that hard items tend to discriminate particu-
larly well at high ability levels, and easy items tend
todiscriminate particularly well at low ability levels
(for further discussion of this point, see Analysis 3
of this section, and see Section 5).
Several insights about our tests can be gained by
comparing and contrasting their item difﬁculties
in Figures 2d–2f. First, the mean item difﬁculty
on AAMT is near the sweet spot of 33% incorrect
(Figure 2e). As discussed just above, this is, all
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while CFMT’s mean item difﬁculty of 25% is
easier than the sweet spot, its mean item difﬁculty
for just Blocks 2 and 3 (dark-grey and black dots,
Figure 2d) is right at the sweet spot (33% incor-
rect). Therefore, after Block 1, the morale-build-
ing learning phase of CFMT for which most
participants perform near ceiling (light-grey dots,
Figure 2d), CFMT contains 54 additional trials
whose mean item difﬁculty is right at the sweet
spot. Third, VPMT’s item difﬁculties, in contrast
to the other two tests, are all greater than the
sweet spot (Figure 2f). Two related consequences
of the relative difﬁculty of VPMT’s items are: (a)
as we demonstrate below in Analysis 3 of this
section, many of VPMT’s items distinguish par-
ticularly well at the high end of performance,
and (b) as we demonstrate below in Section 5,
VPMT, as a whole, distinguishes better at the
high end of performance than at the low end.
Insights about the source of the high reliability
for these three tests can be gleaned from their item
correlations shown on the y-axes of Figures 2d–2f.
First, VPMT has the highest mean item corre-
lation of the three tests (.35, versus .31 for
CFMT and .24 for AAMT). Despite having
fewer items than the other tests (25 items),
VPMT therefore still manages to attain a high
reliability. Second, though AAMT’s mean item
correlation is lower than VPMT’s, its reliability
is equal to VPMT’s because of its greater
number of items (50 items). As mentioned
above, all things equal, increasing test length
increases reliability. Third, while CFMT’s Block
1 contributes little to its reliability (see discussion
of this point in Analysis 1 just above), a ﬁnding
consistent with its positive but low item corre-
lations, CFMT’s remaining 54 items are both
numerous and high in item correlations (54
items is more than VPMT and similar to
AAMT; and the mean item correlation for these
items is .35, higher than AAMT’s mean item cor-
relation and equal to VPMT’s). CFMT’s high
reliability—higher than both AAMT and
VPMT—derives from the numerous items in
CFMT’s Blocks 2 and 3 with high item
correlations.
In sum, substantial insight can be gleaned from
a standard item analysis about the contributions of
individual items to the reliability of a measure. The
item analyses shown in Figures 2d–2f for our three
tests suggest that the individual items on these
tests consistently contribute positive information
to the measurement of the ability being assessed.
While there remains room for potentially creating
more reliable and efﬁcient versions of these tests,
they already have reliability that is high by conven-
tional standards, justifying their use in a wide
variety of circumstances. We now turn to a modi-
ﬁed item analysis that highlights the relationship
between item difﬁculty and the ability of an item
to discriminate effectively over different ranges of
performance. This analysis will provide a concep-
tual link between the focus in the present section
on the reliability of a test and the focus in
Section 5 on the precision of an individual
person’s score on that test.
Analysis 3: Modiﬁed item analysis examining
the high and low ends of performance
Itcan betemptingtoconcludefrom astandarditem
analysis, such as the one conducted just above, that
the ideal test would consist entirely of items right at
the sweet spot of difﬁculty, midway between chance
and ceiling. While such a test would probably dis-
criminate well amongst persons who perform near
the middle of the test’s range (of which there are
often many), it would probably discriminate
poorly amongst persons who perform rather well
on the test, and also poorly amongst persons who
perform rather poorly on the test. A test with a
broader range of difﬁculties is typically preferred
for its ability to more effectively capture perform-
ance across a broader range of ability levels.
Figures2g–2ishowtheresultsofamodiﬁeditem
analysisthatillustrates,morefullythanthestandard
item analysis presented just above, how each item
discriminates at a variety of different performance
levels. The modiﬁed item analysis is, in most ways,
identical to the standard item analysis presented
above. Like that analysis, it correlates performance
on each item with summed performance on the
rest of the test. Unlike that analysis, however, it
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particular percentile cut-off. This focuses the analy-
sis on each item’s ability to discriminate at that per-
centile level of performance. For example, a cut-off
at the 95th percentile focuses the analysis on each
item’s ability to discriminate individuals who score
exceptionally well (at or above the 95th percentile)
from the rest (below the 95th percentile).
As a case in point of how item correlations may
change when focusing on a particular cut-off away
from the middle of the test’s range, consider once
again CFMT’s Block 1. As discussed above, per-
formance on this block is near ceiling, and its
item correlations in a standard item analysis are
low enough that it does not contribute to
CFMT’s reliability. At the 5th-percentile cut-off
(Figure 2g, bottom plot), however, the mean item
correlation for Block 1 (.23) is higher than that of
both Block 2 (.18) and Block 3 (.11), suggesting
that Block 1 contributes substantial information
to distinguishing individuals at a cut-off that
could be critical for clinical decision making. This
case illustrates how the value of certain items may
be obscured by a standard item analysis.
We now take a broader look at these modiﬁed
item analyses across all three tests (Figures 2g–
2i). A tendency can be seen whereby easier items
discriminate better at lower percentile cut-offs
(5th or 10th, bottom two graphs), and harder
items discriminate better at higher percentile
cut-offs (95th or 90th, top two graphs). Items
nearer to the sweet spot of difﬁculty, in contrast,
tend to discriminate better at the median split
cut-off (50th percentile, middle graph). The
50th-percentile cut-off graphs (Figures 2g–2i,
middle) paint a picture similar to the standard
item analyses (Figures 2d–2f). The reason for
this similarity is that the results of standard item
analyses tend to be drawn toward the relatively
large proportion of participants who typically
perform near the median. The progression, from
lower percentile cut-offs, where easier items
discriminate best, to higher percentile cut-offs,
where harder items discriminate best, is
particularly clear for both CFMT (Figure 2g,
bottom-to-top graph) and AAMT (Figure 2h,
bottom-to-top graph). The same basic progression
holds for VPMT (Figure 2i, bottom-to-top), but it
is somewhat less clear because VPMT contains no
items easier than the sweet spot. Still, as with the
other tests, items near VPMT’s sweet spot tend to
discriminate best at the median split cut-off
(Figure 2i, middle graph), and VPMT’s more dif-
ﬁcult items discriminate better at the higher cut-
offs (95th and 90th, top two graphs) than at the
lower cut-offs (5th and 10th, bottom two
graphs). One can imagine that if VPMT had
included items easier than the sweet spot, they
may have discriminated better at the lower cut-
offs (5th and 10th) than the higher cut-offs
(95th and 90th). Consistently across tests, there-
fore, the more difﬁcult the item, the more likely
it is to discriminate well at higher cut-offs.
Modiﬁed item analyses like these provide a
more complete view than standard item analyses
of the contributions of individual items to captur-
ing performance over different ranges of ability.
These item analyses therefore provide more com-
prehensive guidance for deciding which items to
drop and retain when seeking a test that effectively
captures a wide range of performance levels. When
aiming to capture a broad range of performance,
one should favour a range of items that includes
some (usually harder items) that discriminate
well at higher cut-offs and some (usually easier
items) that discriminate well at lower cut-offs.
In Section 5, we pick up where our modiﬁed
item analysis leaves off with an IRT analysis.
IRT moves beyond classic test theory by explicitly
modelling both the performance level that each
item discriminates best at and the power of each
item for discriminating at its optimal performance
level. This more detailed consideration of item
characteristics provides the information necessary
to generate a more principled estimate of each
individual’s ability, complete with error bars that
indicate the precision of that estimate.
SECTION 3. CONVERGENT AND
DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY
In this section, we establish the convergent and dis-
criminant validity of our three measures. Combined
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the reliability analyses in Section 2, the evidence
for validity presented here provides clear support
for the speciﬁcity of face recognition ability.
The validity of a test is generally deﬁned as the
combination of convergent validity, or higher cor-
relations with more theoretically related measures
or manipulations, and discriminant validity, or
lower correlations with less theoretically related
measures or manipulations (Campbell & Fiske,
1959). Together, reasonable evidence for both
convergent and discriminant validity demonstrates
that a test measures what it is designed to measure.
Speciﬁcity is supported when a test shows par-
ticularly acute discriminant validity, correlating
little with reliable and valid tests that measure
either conceptually similar abilities or highly
general abilities like IQ. Conceptually similar abil-
ities may be similar in process, domain, or some
combination of the two. In this section, we dis-
sociate face recognition ability from two tests
that are similar in process to CFMT, involving
recognition memory for recently learned
items, yet different in domain, involving difﬁ-
cult-to-verbalize nonface visual stimuli (AAMT)
and difﬁcult-to-visualize verbal stimuli (VPMT).
We consider convergent validity ﬁrst and dis-
criminant validity second because robust evidence
that each measure taps its intended ability (i.e.,
convergent validity) ampliﬁes the speciﬁcity that
can be inferred from a dissociation between
measures (i.e., discriminant validity). Analyses of
convergent validity show that each of our three
main measures correlates highly with an indepen-
dent test designed to capture a theoretically related
construct. Analyses of discriminant validity show
that our three main measures dissociate strongly
from each other. Given the reliability, convergent
validity, and conceptual similarity of CFMT,
AAMT, and VPMT, the strong dissociation
between them suggests a high degree of speciﬁcity
for face recognition.
Convergent validity
In the paragraphs below, we describe three
additional tests (a Famous Faces Memory Test,
FFMT; an Object and Scene Memory Test,
O S M T ;a n daC o d eL e a r n i n gM e m o r yT e s t ,
CLMT) and report how each of them, respectively,
establishes the a convergent validity of one of our
three main tests (CFMT, AAMT, and VPMT,
respectively).The best evidence for convergent validity
comes from a sizable correlation with a test designed to
capture the mechanism of interest in a rather different
way (a “remote association,” Wilmer, 2008). It is
therefore a strength of these additional tests, for
establishing convergent validity, that they differ in
several ways from our tests of interest.
Famous Face Memory Test (FFMT) and
Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT)
Figure 3a illustrates the procedure for our Famous
Faces Memory Test (FFMT). FFMT consists of
20 total trials. For each trial, the participant is
shown a famous face and is asked “Who is this?”
(Figure 3a, left). If they submit a guess, they are
shown the correct answer along with their guess
and are asked to indicate whether they got the
name correct (Figure 3a, right top). A participant’s
total score on this test is computed as the number
of faces out of 20 for which they submit a guess
and verify that they produced the correct name.
We favour this self-scoring procedure, which we
ﬁnd produces highly accurate results, because it
allows misspellings of the correct answer to be
scored as correct. Participants who do not
produce the correct name are additionally asked
to indicate whether they are familiar with the
person (Figure 3a, right top and bottom), but
this does not ﬁgure into the scoring procedure.
The famous faces are: Angelina Jolie, Audrey
Hepburn, Barack Obama, David Beckham,
Demi Moore, Johnny Depp, Donald Trump,
Fred Astaire, George Clooney, John F. Kennedy,
Jr., Matt Damon, Paul McCartney, Nicole
Kidman, Uma Thurman, Tyra Banks, Margaret
Thatcher, Stephen Colbert, Scarlett Johansson,
Susan Sarandon, and Renee Zellweger.
FFMT differs from CFMT in multiple ways.
For example: (a) While CFMT tests the ability to
recognize which of three faces was seen before,
FFMT tests the ability to recall the name that
goes with a face; (b) while CFMT tests the ability
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before, FFMT tests the ability to draw upon
longer term memories for faces that may have accu-
mulated over months, years, or even decades; and
(3) while CFMT requires no particular knowledge
obtained prior to completing the test, knowledge
of the particular famous faces tested in FFMT
may vary with age and/or cultural literacy.
In Figure 3d, we show data on FFMT and
CFMT. Despite multiple differences in the
time-frame and nature of the memory task,
FFMT and CFMT correlated robustly—r(437) ¼
Figure 3. Convergent validity. (A–C) Schematic descriptions of tests that establish convergent validity (see text for full details). (D–F)
Performance on tests from A–C is plotted against performance on the test whose convergent validity it establishes. Dots in D are jittered
slightly over the range plus-or-minus half an item correct, for improved visibility of individual data points. Least-squares line is drawn.
The data plotted in F were originally reported by Woolley and colleagues (2008). Stimulus shown for FFMT is different from, but chosen
to be representative of, the image of Audrey Hepburn used in the actual test. CFMT ¼ Cambridge Face Memory Test. AAMT ¼
Abstract Art Memory Test. VPMT ¼ Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test.
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6) 375
SPECIFIC ABILITIES.55, 95% [CI .48, .61], 31% of variance explained—
indicating high convergent validity.
The 439 participants in this data set completed
FFMT and CFMT on Testmybrain.org between
January and March, 2010 (315 female; mean age
35 years; standard deviation age 16). On FFMT,
these participants averaged 60.0% correct, with a
standard deviation of 23.7% and a Cronbach’s
alpha reliability of .86. On the CFMT, these par-
ticipants averaged 79.8% correct, with a standard
deviation of 13.2% and a Cronbach’s alpha
reliability of .90.
Object and Scene Memory Test (OSMT) and
Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT)
Figure 3b illustrates the procedure for our Object
and Scene Memory Test (OSMT). OSMT con-
sists of 100 total trials. The basic format of
OSMT is the same as that for AAMT (see
description of AAMT in Section 1 above). Like
AAMT, OSMT starts with a learning phase
where all target images are viewed, one at a time,
and it then proceeds to a test phase where the par-
ticipant is required to identify each target image
amongst two distractor images.
OSMT differs from AAMT in its domain.
Whereas the images in AAMT were abstract and
relatively devoid of semantic information, the
images in OSMT were of objects and scenes that
were rich in semantic information. Despite this
semantic content, test trials in OSMT were
designed such that explicit verbal labels were unli-
kely to aid the recognition process. Verbal labels
were rendered relatively ineffective by choosing
distractors that would typically receive the same
verbal label as the target image. For example, in
Figure 3b, “black binoculars” would describe all
three images in the shown test trial. Likewise,
when the other two learning phase images shown
in Figure 3b were encountered in the test phase,
the labels “lily pads with ﬂower” and “chocolate
ice cream cone” would apply to all three images
shown in the respective test trials.
In Figure 3e, we show data on OSMT and
AAMT. Despite the difference in domain and
the far greater semantic content of stimuli in
OSMT compared to AAMT, these two tests
correlated robustly—r(18) ¼ .68, 95% CI [.34,
.86], 46% of variance explained—indicating high
convergent validity.
The 20 participants in this data set completed
OSMT and AAMT in the lab (12 female; mean
age 48 years; standard deviation age 12). On
OSMT, these participants averaged 83.8%
correct, with a standard deviation of 8.3% and
a Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .83. On the
AAMT, these participants averaged 58.7%
correct, with a standard deviation of 18.9% and a
Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .89.
Code Learning Memory Test (CLMT) and Verbal
Paired-Associates Memory Test (VPMT)
Figure 3c illustrates the procedure for our Code
Learning Memory Test (CLMT). In CLMT, par-
ticipants are given ﬁve minutes to study a list of 22
pairs of codewords and their meanings (e.g., “bug
dust ¼ diversions”). The codeword–meaning
pairs are presented for approximately 13 seconds
each. Participants are then given a set of 46 ﬁcti-
tious email messages written using the codewords.
These emails are written as if recovered from a ter-
rorist organization that uses the studied code.
Participants are allowed to read the emails at
their own pace, but are not allowed to reaccess
the codeword-meaning list after the initial study
period. Participants’ performance on CLMT is
measured by free-response answers to 13 questions
about the content of the emails. Participants’
responses are coded for correctness, and a pro-
portion correct score, out of 13, is calculated.
While CLMT and VPMT are similar in their
requirement to pair one word in memory with
another word, they differ in multiple ways. For
example: (a) While VPMT tests the ability to
recognize which of four word-pairs was seen
before, CLMT tests the ability to recall the word
that was paired with the presented code word;
(b) while VPMT uses abstract, difﬁcult-to-visual-
ize words, CLMT uses both abstract and concrete
words; and (c) while VPMT is presented in a rela-
tively abstract manner, CLMT is embedded in a
vivid narrative.
In Figure 3f, we show data on VPMT and
CLMT, originally reported by Woolley and
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type and amount of verbal material to be remem-
bered, the method of testing memory, and the
response modality, the two tasks correlated
robustly—r(50) ¼ .48, 95% CIs [.24, .67], 23%
of variance explained—indicating high convergent
validity.
The 52 participants in this data set completed
CLMT, VPMT, and CFMT in the lab (40
female; mean age 31 years; standard deviation
age 10). On CLMT, these participants averaged
40.0% correct, with a standard deviation of
25.1%. On VPMT, these participants averaged
49.5% correct, with a standard deviation of
20.0%. On CFMT, these participants averaged
73.4% correct, with a standard deviation of
13.7%. Internal reliability statistics are not avail-
able for this data set. In contrast to the robust
correlation between VPMT and CLMT,
CFMT dissociated strongly from both
VPMT—r(50) ¼ .12, 95% CIs [–.16, .38], 1%
of variance explained—and CLMT—r(50) ¼
.08, 95% CIs [–.20, .34], 1% of variance
explained.
Discriminant validity
The best evidence for discriminant validity comes from
a low correlation with a test designed to capture a
similar process or domain (a “proximal dissociation”;
Wilmer, 2008). Itis therefore a strength ofour two
control tests (AAMT and VPMT), for establish-
ing discriminant validity, that they and CFMT
are all designed to capture a similar process: recog-
nition memory for novel, recently encountered
stimuli. Given evidence provided above that
CFMT, AAMT, and VPMT are all reliable and
high in convergent validity, we are now poised to
consider whether they dissociate from each other
clearly enough to support an inference of speci-
ﬁcity for face recognition.
Figure 4 plots the correlations of CFMT with
both AAMT and VPMT. These correlations are
low, explaining just a few percentage points of var-
iance. CFMT correlates .26 with AAMT (95% CI
[.21, .31], Figure 4a, 6.8% of variance explained)
and .18 with VPMT (95% CI [.13, .23], Figure
4b, 3.1% of variance explained). AAMT and
VPMT also largely dissociate from each other,
correlating .25 (95% CI [.20,.30],6.3% of variance
explained). In regression analyses, AAMT and
VPMT together explained only 8.1% of the var-
iance in CFMT, and this value was even smaller
(6.8%) with age regressed out of the tests (to
account for the curvilinear relationship between
age and our tests—see discussion of norms in
Section 4 below—age was regressed out of each
test with a second order regression).
Figure 4. Discriminant validity. Performance on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) is plotted against performance on (A) an
Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT) and (B) a Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test (VPMT). For improved visibility of individual
data points, dots are jittered slightly over the range plus-or-minus half an item correct. Least-squares lines are drawn.
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correlations of CFMT with AAMT and VPMT
(left two bars) next to the higher variance explained
by the three convergent validity correlations dis-
cussed above (right three bars). Clearly, CFMT dis-
sociates strongly from AAMT and VPMT, relative
to its higher correlation with FFMT. Moreover,
CFMT’s low correlations with AAMT and
VPMT are not due to low convergent validity of
AAMT or VPMT, as both AAMT and VPMT
correlate highly with an independently designed
measure aimed at capturing a theoretically related
construct. Neither are CFMT’s low correlations
with AAMT and VPMT due to low reliability.
The upper bounds on these correlations, set by the
reliability of these tests, are .846 and .854,
respectively (upper bounds in Figure 5 are shown
by horizontal lines above bars; see Section 2 for
i n f o r m a t i o no nt h e o r ya n dc o m p u t a t i o no fu p p e r
bounds). As described above under “Convergent
validity”, CFMT also dissociates strongly from
CLMT. Together, these dissociations provide
strongevidenceforthespeciﬁcityoffacerecognition
ability.
Clinically, our data have clear implications for
the likelihood that a prospective developmental
prosopagnosic individual who has been ﬂagged
based on a given diagnostic cut-off score on
CFMT will ultimately demonstrate a deﬁcit that
is speciﬁc to faces. Consider, for example, that of
the 30 (2.0%) of individuals in our sample who
scored more than two standard deviations below
Figure 5. Speciﬁcity of face recognition ability. Convergent and discriminant validity correlations from Figures 3 and 4 are plotted here in
terms of variance explained to demonstrate the Cambridge Face Memory Test’s (CFMT’s) speciﬁcity. Labels and pictures below each bar
indicate the two tasks correlated. Error bars are +1 SE. Horizontal lines above each bar indicate the upper bound on variance
explained set by the reliability of the tests being correlated. Since the Code Learning Memory Test’s (CLMT’s) reliability is not known,
upper bound for rightmost correlation is estimated as the Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test’s (VPMT’s) reliability. The substantial
independence of CFMT from the Abstract Art Memory Test (AAMT) and VPMT, and CFMT’s high association with the Famous Faces
Memory Test (FFMT), indicate the combination of acute discriminant validity and high convergent validity necessary to demonstrate
that an ability is speciﬁc. OSMT ¼ Object and Scene Memory Test. Critically, CFMT’s strong dissociations with AAMT and VPMT
can be explained neither by poor reliability, as the upper bounds on left two correlations are high, nor by poor convergent validity for
AAMT or VPMT, as each shows substantial association with a theoretically related task designed to demonstrate its convergent validity.
OSMT ¼ Object and Scene Memory Test.
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mean, and another 8 scored within a single stan-
dard deviation below AAMT’s mean. Similarly,
9 of these 30 individuals scored above VPMT’s
mean, and 10 scored within a single standard devi-
ation below VPMT’s mean. The mean AAMT
and VPMT z scores for these prospective proso-
pagnosic individuals were –0.65 and –0.43,
respectively. In short, the majority of individuals
in our large, unselected population whose
CFMT scores meet a commonly used diagnostic
cut-off for developmental prosopagnosia show
little evidence of a more general verbal, or even
visual, recognition impairment.
In sum, CFMT shows robust evidence for
speciﬁcity by dissociating strongly from two
other theoretically driven, reliable, and valid tests
of recognition memory.
SECTION 4. EXTENSIVE NORMS
Having supported face recognition’s speciﬁcity in
Sections 1–3, we now turn our attention, in
Sections 4 and 5, to enabling the most meaningful
interpretation of an individual person’s perform-
ance on our tests. Here in Section 4 we facilitate
this interpretation by establishing norms for our
three main tests, including provision of the entire
normative data set as supplementary information
(this same data set was used for the reliability ana-
lyses, item analyses, and convergent validity ana-
lyses reported in Sections 2 and 3 above). Below,
in Section 5, we apply powerful IRT methods to
this normative data set.
Norms enable the interpretation of a particular
score for a particular individual by deﬁning a refer-
ence distribution to which the individual’s per-
formance can be compared. For example, it may
be desirable to compare an individual to those of
similar age or similar gender. The 1,471-person
data set we provide as supplementary information
can be used to compute either a z score or percen-
tile score, based on the most appropriate reference
distribution, for any new individual who takes one
or more of these tests. The ability to pull together
such a reference group on the ﬂy provides maximal
ﬂexibility to such normative analyses, whether they
are being used to inform diagnostic criteria or to
capture normal variation.
As we see in Section 5, the size of this data set
and the inclusion of item-by-item data also
support the generation of a sophisticated IRT-
based score for any new individual who takes one
or more of these tests. A key virtue of IRT-based
scores is that they include unique error bars—a
measure of precision—for each individual, some-
thing that no other scoring procedure provides.
Such unique error bars are particularly useful in
clinical contexts, where establishing the conﬁdence
with which a person’s score meets (or misses) a
diagnostic threshold is of key importance.
Overview of norms
Since the availability of our normative data set as
supplementary information provides direct access
to detailed normative information for our tests,
our chief aim in this subsection is to convey a
general ﬂavour for this data set, and to develop
the reader’s intuitions for it, via the visual displays
provided in Figure 6.
Figures 6a–6c characterize the overall distri-
bution of performance for CFMT, AAMT, and
VPMT, respectively. For each test, the mean,
median, standard deviation, skewness, and 95%
conﬁdence interval for skewness, respectively, are:
74.2%, 75.0%, 13.7%, –0.28, and [–0.41, –0.16]
for CFMT; 64.8%, 66.0%, 13.7%, –0.23, and
[–.35, –.10] for AAMT; and 46.4%, 44.0%,
21.1%,0.53,and[0.40,0.65]forVPMT.Themod-
erate positive skew of VPMT raises the question of
whether it may discriminate better at the high end
of performance than the low end (due to a possible
ﬂoor effect). Conversely, the negative skews of
CFMT and AAMT, though small in magnitude,
raise the question of whether one or both tests
may discriminate better at the low end of perform-
ance than at the high end (due to a possible ceiling
effect). As we see below in Section 5, VPMT does
discriminate best at the high end, consistent with
some degree of ﬂoor effect. In contrast, CFMT
and AAMT discriminate equally well at both the
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dence for a ceiling effect.
Our tests show clear age and sex effects. Figures
6d–6f summarize mean performance on our three
main tests by age (x-axis) and sex (black ¼
females, grey ¼ males). Each dot represents the
mean performance, for a given sex, at one age or
over several ages (multiple ages were grouped, as
necessary, to have at least 35 values per dot). Dot
size is proportional to the number of individual
values that it represents. Standard deviations are
represented by lines, drawn upward for females
Figure 6. Norms. Data from our large normative data set (n ¼ 1,471) are plotted. This data set is provided in its entirety, in item-by-item
form, as supplementary information. X-axes for all graphs in each column are shown below C and F; Y-axes for all graphs in each column are
shown beside B and E. (A–C) Overall distributions with best ﬁtting normalcurve. (D–F) Data plotted by age and sex, with females in black
and males in grey. Vertical lines indicate standard deviation for each data point. For visibility, lines are plotted up for females and down for
males. Each dot indicates mean performance either at a single age or over several binned ages. Ages were binned when a single age had fewer
than 35 participants,starting from the age of the youngest participant (9) and working upward.Horizontal position of dot indicatesthe mean
age in that bin. Dots are drawn with areas proportional to the number of persons for that dot. CFMT ¼ Cambridge Face Memory Test.
AAMT ¼ Abstract Art Memory Test. VPMT ¼ Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test.
380 Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6)
WILMER ET AL.and downward for males. While most participants
are between their late teen years and their early
30s, there are 121, 85, and 45 participants, respect-
ively, in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, sufﬁcient for
robust norms based on decade of life. Females per-
formed somewhat better than males on all three
tests: CFMT (means 74.9% and 72.8%, respect-
ively, p ¼ .007), AAMT (means 65.2% and
63.7%, respectively, p ¼ .05), VPMT (means
47.4% and 44.4%, respectively, p ¼ .01). On
CFMT, at least for females, performance appears
to increase into the 30s and decrease thereafter
(Figure 6d), consistent with a previous report in
a sample of 60,000 participants that used an
alternative form of CFMT as well as other non-
CFMT-format face recognition tests (Germine,
Duchaine, et al., 2011). There is a suggestion in
the data that AAMT and/or VPMT may peak
somewhat earlier (Figures 6e–6f).
One advantage of the IRT analyses described in
the next section is that they are, under a wide range
of conditions, sample independent (Embretson,
1996). Practically speaking, sample independence
means that the z scores they generate are not
tied to the mean and standard deviation of that
particular sample, but should be the same across
a wide range of different samples, with different
means and different standard deviations. In this
way, IRT simpliﬁes the collection of normative
data sets by removing the ﬁrm requirement that
the mean and standard deviation be representative
of the population that the norms will be applied to.
The means and standard deviations in the current
data set are, nevertheless, comparable to those
observed in other lab and web-based samples
(Germine et al., 2012; Wilmer et al., 2010), once
the relatively young age of this sample (mean ¼
23.6 years and median ¼ 20 years) is taken into
account (compare with mean ¼ 27.5 years and
median ¼ 25 years in Wilmer et al., 2010).
In sum, the data set provided as supplemental
information provides a basis for generating tra-
ditionalage-and sex-matched norms for both clini-
calandnonclinicaluse.InSection5,wediscusshow
this data set can be used to generate a more sophis-
ticated, IRT-based estimate of ability that includes
unique error bars for each individual person.
Further details of normative data set
The normative data set provided with this paper
includes item-by-item accuracy information for
our three main tests (CFMT, AAMT, and
VPMT), age, sex, and the date and time that
testing was initiated, for each of 1,471 web-
tested participants.
These data were collected from October 7 to
December 13, 2009, via Testmybrain.org as part
of a battery called “Words, Faces, and Abstract
Art”. The order of the tests was: (a) learning
phase of VPMT, (b) AAMT, (c) test phase of
VPMT, and (d) CFMT. The 1,471 participants
included in this data set were 73% of an original
2,020 who completed all three tests, minus 549
(27%) who were excluded for the following
reasons: 440 (22%) for answering “no” to the ques-
tion “Is English your ﬁrst language (or one of your
ﬁrst)?”, 10 (,1%) for not reporting using either a
desktop or a laptop computer, 48 (2%) for report-
ing technical problems, 48 (2%) for reporting
having taken the battery previously, and 3
(,1%) for not reporting an age. The remaining
participants ranged in age from 11 to 81 years,
with a median of 20, mean of 24, and standard
deviation of 10. A total of 995 (67%) were female.
The dropping of participants listed above was
done as a precaution, in order to ensure the
highest quality normative data set. The results
reported in this paper, however, remain essentially
identical when all original 2,020 participants are
included in analyses. Even the 440 participants
who reported not having English as one of their
ﬁrst languages performed as well as the 1,471
retained participants on CFMT and AAMT (p-
values of differences were .60 and .93, respectively,
despite the large numbers), and nearly as well on
VPMT (mean performance of 74.2% versus
74.6%, p ¼ .03).
As a rough indicator of where Testmybrain.org
participants tend to come from, we recently
(during 2011) asked 4,590 participants to report
their country of residence. Eighty percent of par-
ticipants came from the following 10 countries:
the United States (46%), the United Kingdom
(11%), India (6%), Canada (5%), Australia (4%),
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Sweden (1%), and Romania (1%), with a large
number of other countries contributing less than
1% of participants each. Overall, approximately
24% of participants came from countries where
English is not an ofﬁcial language.
SECTION 5. DETAILED, MODEL-
BASED ANALYSIS OF ABILITY AND
PRECISION
In Sections 1–3, we established that face recog-
nition, as measured by CFMT, is a speciﬁc
ability. Section 4 established the norms necessary
for gauging how an individual’s performance com-
pares to that of others. Here in Section 5, we
further enable the interpretation of individual per-
formance by deriving a more sophisticated, model-
based estimate of an individual’s ability, based on
IRT, that includes unique error bars for each indi-
vidual person.
The precision of an estimate of performance, or
ability, may be deﬁned by its standard error of
measurement: The smaller the standard error of
measurement, the higher the precision. Precision and
reliability are essentially equivalent concepts. The
higher the reliability, the higher the precision. In
Section 2, we focused on the reliability, and by
extension the precision, of the test as a whole.
Here, we conduct a more ﬁne-grained, IRT-
based analysis that enables an estimate of precision
for each individual. These precision estimates
allow us to more fully interpret individual scores.
The power of the item-by-item normative data
set provided as supplementary information is par-
ticularly notable in the context of these IRT-based
analyses. The accessibility of this data set means
that when a further individual takes one of these
tests, their item-by-item data can be directly ana-
lysed, in concert with that normative data set, to
derive their z scored IRT-based ability estimate,
along with error bars on that estimate. The IRT
analysis conducted here also enables an important
further insight into the nature of our tests. That is,
it indicates how the precision of each test tends to
vary from one ability level to the next.
To provide a link to the reliability analyses
conducted in Section 2, we begin with the rela-
tively crude, one-size-ﬁts-all, classic test theory
approach to placing error bars on individual
scores. That is, the overall reliability of a test
can be used to compute a single estimate of test
precision (i.e., a single standard error). This esti-
mate is not calibrated by ability level, nor is it
calibrated by individual participants (both calibra-
tions that are accomplished by IRT). This pre-
cision estimate is, nonetheless, useful in that it
provides an initial, rough, simple-to-calculate
default estimate of the precision of an individual’s
score. This precision, expressed in terms of stan-
dard error of measurement, is computed via the
formula:
SE ¼ SD ×
p
(1 – reliability)
where SE is the standard error of measurement
for the individual score, SD is the standard devi-
ation of scores on the test (to obtain the SE in z
score units, this SD is set to 1.0), and reliability
is an estimate of overall test reliability such as
Cronbach’s alpha.
In our normative data set, the Cronbach’s alpha
reliabilities and standard deviations, respectively,
for our three tests were: .89 and 13.2% for
CFMT, .80 and 13.7% for AAMT, and .81 and
21.1% for VPMT. The default SEs for these
three tests, in percentage correct and z score
units, respectively, were therefore: 4.4% and .32
for CFMT, 6.2% and .45 for AAMT, and 9.1%
and .43 for VPMT.
The precision of scores on a test, however,
routinely vary across ability levels and, moreover,
across individuals at a given ability level.
The IRT-based analyses discussed below
provide a framework within which to understand
these variations in test precision. As a preview of
the IRT-based SEs that will be presented below
(Figures 8a–8c), these SEs ranged, in z score
units, from 0.21 to 0.47 (mean 0.28) for
CFMT, from 0.33 to 0.60 (mean 0.40) for
AAMT, and from 0.28 to 0.74 (mean 0.42) for
VPMT.
The IRT-based analyses discussed below also
make clear why percentage correct is not always
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and how characteristics of each item can be
modelled to derive a more principled estimate
of an individual’s ability. We start with an illus-
tration of the so-called item response function
(IRF). This IRF models the relationship
between ability level and performance on a
given item. The IRF can be used to illuminate
the central insights of IRT-based analysis.
Minitutorial on item response theory
A basic insight of IRT is that it is possible to expli-
citly determine both the ability level at which each
item discriminates best and the power of each item
for discriminating at that optimal ability level.
Remember, once again, that in Section 2, we con-
ducted a modiﬁed item analysis illustrating that
easier items tend to distinguish individuals best
at low ability levels, and harder items tend to dis-
tinguish individuals best at higher ability levels.
Here, we pick up where that analysis left off,
taking a more detailed look at where in the
ability range particular items provide the most
discriminating information.
The ability level at which an item provides the
most discriminating information can be visualized
by looking at that item’s item response function
(IRF). Figure 7 shows three such IRFs, one for
each of three items on CFMT, plotted based
upon our 1,471-person normative data set
described in Section 4. IRFs plot the probability
of answering a given item correctly (y-axis)
against an estimate of the ability level of a person
(x-axis). In Figure 7, ability is estimated by the
proportion correct on the rest of the test (excluding
the item under consideration in order to have an
independent ability estimate unconfounded by
performance on that particular item). IRT analyses
ultimately generate a more principled estimate of
ability level, which is often plotted as the ability
estimate in an IRF. We plot proportion correct
here for simplicity and transparency.
Again, three IRFs are shown in Figure 7, each
in a different greyscale shade. Each IRF demon-
strates how ability predicts performance for one
Figure 7. Item response function. Item performance plotted against ability level for three illustrative items in the Cambridge Face Memory Test
(CFMT):oneharditem(black),oneeasyitem(lightgrey),andoneitemofmoderatedifﬁculty(dark grey).Eachdotrepresents theperformanceof
allindividualsofa particularabilitylevel ononeofthesethreeitems.Ability level is computedasproportioncorrectonCFMT,excludingtheitem
being looked at. Item performance is computed as the proportion of individuals at a given ability level who answered that item correctly. Dots are
drawn with area proportionalto thenumberof persons with that ability level. Ability levels werebinnedwhen necessary so each one contained at
least10participants,startingfromthelowestperformingparticipant(23of72totalitemscorrect)andworkingupward.Wherebinningoccurred,
the ability level was averaged across all participants in that bin.
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dots represent an easy item answered correctly
by 98% of participants, the dark-grey dots
represent a moderate difﬁculty item answered
correctly by 70% of participants, and the black
dots represent a hard item answered correctly by
only 37% of participants. It is clear from examin-
ing these IRFs that individuals of very high
ability have a high probability of answering all
three items correctly. Yet the shape of the func-
tion and, correspondingly, the range over which
it best discriminates performance, differ markedly
for the three items. The easy item, in light grey,
discriminates well only amongst individuals in
the lower range of ability. Over this low range,
individuals with a relatively higher ability are
more likely to answer this item correctly than
those with a relatively lower ability. This easy
item does not discriminate well, however,
amongst individuals of middle to high ability
levels, as individuals across that entire range gen-
erally perform at ceiling on this item. In contrast
to this easy item in light grey, the moderate difﬁ-
culty item in dark grey discriminates best over the
middle ability levels, and the hard item in black
discriminates best over the highest ability levels.
In the context of Figure 7, it can be seen that
an item discriminates best where its item response
function is steepest. It can also be seen that items
differ in the ability level at which their item
response functions are steepest. Finally, one can
imagine how a shallower slope would characterize
a noisier or less valid item that less effectively cap-
tures the ability of interest (as indicated by a rela-
tively large number of higher ability individuals
getting it wrong and a relatively large number
of lower ability individuals getting it right).
The IRF allows one to derive two key item-
speciﬁc parameters that vary from one item to the
next. The ﬁrst item parameter is the ability level
at which an item response function is steepest, indi-
cating the ability that it discriminates best at. The
second item parameter is the maximum steepness
of the item response function, indicating how effec-
tively an item discriminates at its optimal ability
level. These item-speciﬁc parameters provide the
fundamental basis for IRT analyses by allowing
different items to provide different types of infor-
mation about a given person.
The IRT model we use also estimates a third
parameter that indicates the ﬂoor of perform-
ance for a given item. Such a parameter is
helpful for cases where ﬂoor performance for
low-ability individuals may not be right at
chance, such as when such low-ability individ-
uals are disproportionately drawn to choose a
particularly enticing distractor (and thereby
perform below chance).
In some contexts, it may be desirable to esti-
mate a fourth parameter that indicates ceiling per-
formance for a given item. Such a parameter is
helpful for cases where ceiling performance for
higher ability individuals plateaus at a level below
100% correct. We regarded this fourth parameter
as unnecessary in the present context because
items that showed a plateau—for example, the
easy (light-grey dots) and moderate difﬁculty
(dark-grey dots) items from CFMT shown in
Figure 7—generally plateaued at or near 100%
correct. In general, it is best to use the minimum
number of parameters that adequately model a
test’s IRFs, because modelling more parameters
requires more data to achieve equally precise par-
ameter and ability estimates (Edelen & Reeve,
2007). On multiple-choice tests, the three-par-
ameter model we used is frequently considered
optimal.
Once each item’s parameters are estimated, a
person’s performance on these items can be used
to estimate both their ability and the standard
error of the estimate of their ability. A person
who frequently answers the easiest items incor-
rectly, for example, will generally be estimated to
have low ability, whereas a person who frequently
answers the hardest items correctly will generally
be estimated to have high ability. The standard
errors, or precision, of the ability estimates is
derived from the consistency with which a
person performs relatively well on easier items
and relatively poorly on harder items. For
example, compared to a person who consistently
answers easy items correctly and hard items at
chance, a person with the same overall percentage
correct score but lower consistency, answering
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than chance on the hard items, may receive a
similar ability estimate but with a larger standard
error (for additional reading on IRT, see
Embretson, 1996; Embretson & Reise, 2000;
Hambleton & Jones, 1993; Lord & Novick, 1968).
Item response theory analyses of our data
Figure 8 presents the key results of the three-par-
ameter IRT analysis discussed just above for each
of our three tests, computed using our normative
data set. In the large main graphs of Figures 8a–8c,
IRT-derived ability estimates for each individual
Figure 8. Item response theory (IRT) analyses of ability and precision for individual persons. The large main graphs in A–C plot IRT-
derived ability estimates for each individual person on both axes, with +1 standard error shown as a vertical grey line. The reason for
plotting ability level on both axes is to allow the upper and lower extent of the error bars to be read directly on the y-axis in terms of
ability level. The small inset graphs in A–C plot the same information as that shown in the large main graphs in A–C, with the same
x-axis, but with a different y-axis that shows the standard error directly (still in z score units). The y-axis in these small inset graphs is
magniﬁed to emphasize the variation in standard errors among individuals even at a single ability level (each dot is one individual).
The graphs in D–F again plot the same information in the same basic format as the large main graphs in A–C, but now in percentile
units. The error bars in D–F end at the percentile ability level that would be reached by increasing or decreasing that person’s ability
estimate, in z score units, by its standard error. Note that while the standard errors in z score units (A–C) tend to expand with
increasing distance from the middle range of abilities, the standard errors in percentile units (D–F) tend to contract with increasing
distance from the middle range of abilities, a natural consequence of the nonlinear relationship between z score units and percentile units.
CFMT ¼ Cambridge Face Memory Test. AAMT ¼ Abstract Art Memory Test. VPMT ¼ Verbal Paired-Associates Memory Test.
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with +1 standard error shown as a vertical grey
line. The reason for plotting ability level on both
axes is to allow the upper and lower extent of the
error bars to be read directly on the y-axis in
terms of ability level. The small inset graphs in
A–C plot the same information as that shown in
the large main graphs in Figures 8a–8c, with the
same x-axis, but with a different y-axis that shows
the standard error directly (still in z score units).
The y-axis in these small inset graphs is magniﬁed
to emphasize the variation in standard errors
among individuals even at a single ability level
(each dot is one individual).
A key commonality among these tests that can
be seen in Figures 8a–8c is the overall U-shaped
relationship between the ability and error of indi-
vidual participants. That is, less extreme scores
generally have smaller error (greater precision)
than more extreme scores. Differences exist
among these tests, however, in the particular
form of their U-shaped relationships. CFMT,
shown in Figure 8a, generally has smaller error
(greater precision) than AAMT and VPMT
(Figures 8b–8c), as one would expect from
CFMT’s higher overall reliability. VPMT’s error,
however, is similar to CFMT’s above a z score of
about 1.0. AAMT’s and VPMT’s results differ
considerably from each other, with AAMT
having smaller error over the lower range of per-
formance and VPMT having smaller error over
the higher range of performance. VPMT has the
least symmetrical U-shaped function, showing
substantially smaller error at high ability levels
than at low ability levels.
The form of the relationship between ability
and precision for each test has distinct impli-
cations. First, CFMT has higher precision
(smaller error) across ability levels, supporting its
use for capturing the broad spectrum of face recog-
nition ability. Second, VPMT produces precise,
low-error results at high ability levels but is less
precise for capturing lower ability levels. This
result suggests that VPMT could be particularly
effective for identifying those with superior
verbal recognition (indeed, this is what it was orig-
inally designed for; see Woolley et al., 2008), while
it would be less effective as a diagnostic test to
identify impairments in verbal recognition.
VPMT’s greater precision at higher ability levels
results primarily from the difﬁculty of its items,
which tend to discriminate relatively well
between high-ability individuals (as indicated by
the modiﬁed item analysis shown in Figure 2i).
Third, AAMT is capable of capturing a broad
range of ability levels, though it does so less pre-
cisely than CFMT. The AAMT may thus be
thought of as a similar general-purpose instrument
to CFMT, but one that captures individual per-
formance with somewhat less precision. Overall,
the ability to place error bars on individual ability
estimates for each of these three tests critically
enables the meaningful interpretation of an indi-
vidual person’s proﬁle of scores across these tests.
In certain circumstances, it may be helpful to
think of error on a test in percentile units. For
example, say that a diagnostic threshold has been
set at the 5th percentile and an individual scores
in the 10th percentile. A standard error that
encompasses 5 percentile units in a downward
direction (that is, that stretches to the 5th percen-
tile) would put the lower reach of the 68% conﬁ-
dence interval for that participant right at the
diagnostic threshold (given that SE bars indicate
a 68% CI). In such a case, one’s conﬁdence in a
lack of diagnosis for that individual would be
rather low, and one might want to conduct
additional diagnostic testing to be more conﬁdent
of that individual’s ability level.
Figures 8d–8f plot the same information in
the same basic format as the large main graphs
in Figures 8a–8c, but now in percentile units.
In particular, the error bars in Figures 3d–3f
end at the percentile ability level that would be
reached by increasing or decreasing that person’s
ability estimate, in z score units, by its standard
error.
A notable difference between standard errors in
z score units, as in Figures 8a–8c, versus standard
errors in percentile units, as in Figures 8d–8f, is
how these errors change with increasing distance
from the median ability level. Note that the z-
score-based standard errors in Figures 8a–8c
tend to increase with increasing distance from
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based standard errors in Figures 8d–8f tend to
decrease with increasing distance from the
median ability level. This opposite pattern results
from the fundamental relationship between z
scores and percentiles. For almost any natural dis-
tribution of performance, even those that are
highly non-normal, there tend to be more individ-
uals in the middle portion of that distribution than
at the extremes ofthat distribution. A given z score
change will therefore correspond to a larger per-
centile change near the middle portion of the dis-
tribution than at its extremes. The result of this is
that even though there is a substantially larger
standard error in z score units at the extremes of
ability level for these measures, this corresponds
to a relatively small standard error in percentile
units. Depending on the inference to be made,
one might prefer either z score units or percentile
units. Thinking in percentiles is often helpful
when making inferences about how one individual
compares to others.
Additional notes on item response theory
(IRT)
Although IRT has a number of advantages over
classic test development methods (Embretson,
1996), we see three central advantages when the
aim is to capture speciﬁc abilities. First, unlike tra-
ditional normed scores (see Section 4), IRT scores
include precision, in the form of unique standard
error bars, for each individual. These individual
error bars, discussed just above in relation to
Figure 8, increase the interpretability of individual
scores in both clinical and nonclinical contexts.
Second, these individual error bars can be looked
at en masse, as we have done above (again, see dis-
cussion of Figure 8), to characterize the overall
precision of a measurement tool over different
ranges of performance. This information on the
precision of a test across ability levels can be used
to decide on an appropriate test for a given
purpose or to reﬁne a test to be sensitive to a
wider (or narrower) range of human variation.
Third, IRT scores are less tied to the particular
normative sample that was used to compute
them than are traditional normed z scores. That
is, under a wide range of conditions, one will
obtain the same IRT-based z score for an individ-
ual even when that individual’s z score is computed
based on different normative samples with differ-
ent fundamental statistical characteristics (e.g.,
different raw score means or standard deviations).
We point the reader to outside resources for a
detailed discussion of the generalizability of IRT
scores across normative samples (Embretson,
1996; Embretson & Reise, 2000).
TheIRTanalysesreportedinthispaperwerecon-
ducted in the statistical program R (r-project.org),
using the function tpm from the package ltm.
Given the below ﬁve lines of code, R will ﬁt the
basic three-parameter model that we have used,
then output individual ability and standard error
values. For further details on using R to ﬁt IRT
models, see the R website, the documentation for
the ltm package, and the various print and online
resources for using R. A number of other software
packages are also available for conducting IRT
analyses.





These ﬁve lines do the following: Line 1 loads
the data from a ﬁle of the standard csv (comma
separated values) ﬁle type where rows are partici-
pants, columns are items, and 0 ¼ correct and 1
¼ incorrect. Line 2 ﬁts the three-parameter
model. Line 3 computes individual ability and
standard error values, in z score units. Lines 4
and 5 output the individual ability and standard
error values to csv ﬁles.
How many participants are required to ﬁt a IRT
modelthatwillgeneraterobustindividualabilityand
standard error estimates? The answer depends on a
number of factors, including the number of par-
ameters in the model (more parameters require
more participants) and the quality of the items
(higher discriminability of items requires fewer par-
ticipants) (Embretson & Reise, 2000). A common
heuristic for the three-parameter model used here
is that 1,000 participants are sufﬁcient to obtain
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(Kim,2006;Yen,1987).Importantly,onceanitem-
by-item normative sample exists that is of sufﬁcient
size to ﬁt a robust IRT model for a given test, that
model can then be applied to generate ability and
precision estimates for any further individual who
takes the test.
In sum, IRT-based analyses provide a more
principled estimate of ability and allow the place-
ment of error bars, in either z score or percentile
units, on that ability. Using the normative data
set provided as supplementary information, IRT-
based ability and error estimates can be derived
for any further individual who takes one or more
of our tests. The ability to derive these estimates
enables maximally meaningful interpretations of
an individual’s proﬁle of scores across tests.
DISCUSSION
We argue that the time is right for a renewed
investigation of speciﬁc abilities, in order to more
fully understand the many unique ways in which
individuals can vary. Advances in three comp-
lementary domains are well-placed to support
such investigations. First, basic neural and cogni-
tive sciences increasingly isolate mechanisms that
could potentially vary independently between indi-
viduals. Second, modern psychometric methods
provide powerful techniques for isolating and
measuring speciﬁc abilities. Third, high-quality
web testing provides the throughput necessary to
swiftly hone tests and produce large normative
data sets that enhance the interpretability of each
individual score. We present face recognition as a
model example of how these three domains can
come together to facilitate the isolation and
measurement of a speciﬁc ability. Ultimately, we
hope that improved measurement of a wide
variety of speciﬁc abilities will inspire a keener
understanding of our own individuality, a richer
appreciation for the variety of minds around us,
and a broader view on the diversity of human
potential.
The present efforts capture face recognition as a
speciﬁc ability through the application of ﬁve key
test development criteria. The ﬁrst three criteria
focus on isolation, or evaluation of the degree of
speciﬁcity for the candidate ability. These ﬁrst
three criteria are: (1) clear theory of process or
domain, (2) high reliability, and (3) convergent
and discriminant validity. By applying these cri-
teria, we dissociate face recognition from more
general visual and verbal recognition yet show
strong convergence between face recognition
tests, thereby demonstrating a high degree of
speciﬁcity. The ﬁnal two criteria focus on measure-
ment, or generation of the most informative scores
for each individual who takes the test. These ﬁnal
two criteria are: (4) extensive norms and (5)
detailed, model-based analysis of ability and
precision via Item Response Theory (IRT). By
applying these criteria, we enable precise, norm-
referenced estimates of an individual’s face recog-
nition ability, complete with individual standard
error bars. Further, we characterize the precision
of our measures over the full range of ability
levels, from clinically poor to exceptionally good.
Our approach to the majority of these criteria
(2–5) was greatly facilitated by high-volume web
testing. In addition, the availability of our entire
normative data set as supplementary information
will enable future researchers to generate the
same norm-referenced and model-based estimates
of ability for their participants as we have gener-
ated here for our participants.
It is worth dwelling on three particular contri-
butions of IRT to the robust measurement of an
ability. First, IRT’s unique capacity to generate
error bars for each individual’s score is valuable
for clinical decision making because it speciﬁes
the conﬁdence with which a given individual sur-
passes, or falls short of, a diagnostic threshold.
Second, the individual error bars that IRT pro-
duces may be looked at en masse, as we have
done in Figure 8, to characterize the precision of
a measurement tool as a whole over different
ranges of performance. Third, unlike traditional
norm-based z scores, IRT-based z scores are
largely independent of the normative sample
from which they are calculated (Embretson,
1996). That is, under a wide range of conditions,
one will obtain the same IRT-based z score for
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computed based on different normative samples
with different fundamental statistical character-
istics (e.g., different raw score means or standard
deviations).
Despite these advantages, at least two key
factors tend to limit IRT’s application. First,
there is a signiﬁcant learning curve to grasp both
the fundamental concepts of IRT and the statisti-
cal packages available to implement IRT. With
this in mind, we have aimed to provide enough
information above to understand basic IRT ana-
lyses, to get out of the starting blocks with one’s
own analyses, and to know of some places to
look for further information. The second limiting
factor is the need for large, item-by-item data sets
(Kim, 2006; Yen, 1987). We suggest that collect-
ing and sharing large web-based data sets, as we do
here, could be a valuable approach to overcoming
this limiting factor. IRT, originally developed for
use with the Scholastic Aptitude Test, has contrib-
uted greatly to our ability to assess general abilities.
We suggest that IRT has underutilized potential
for capturing speciﬁc abilities and, in turn, inspir-
ing a richer appreciation of each individual’s
unique blend of strengths and weaknesses.
The present investigation builds on and extends
past studies of selective developmental disorders
that have dissociated face recognition from more
general recognition (e.g., Duchaine et al., 2006;
Germine, Cashdollar, et al., 2011; Moscovitch
et al., 1997). In theory, such dissociations could
have turned out to be rare exceptions to a general
rule of close yoking between face and nonface rec-
ognition abilities. Yet our results suggest differ-
ently. They argue that such dissociations are the
rule, not the exception. A look at Figure 4
plainly indicates that severely impaired face recog-
nition ability implies little about one’s overall
visual recognition ability and verbal recognition
ability. The same can be observed across the
entire spectrum of ability ranging from clinically
poor to exceptionally good. Based on these
results, we can therefore conclude that there
exists a deeper and more pervasive independence
between face recognition and other recognition
abilities than could have been concluded from
prior patient-based research. A clear practical
implication of this result is that one probably
learns little about an individual’s ability to recog-
nize faces from their scores—even their visual
memory scores—on a general battery of memory
tests such as the Wechsler Memory Scale
(Wechsler, 1997, 2009).
The story recounted in the introduction, about
the face memory test that was dropped from the
fourth edition of the Wechsler Memory Scale
(Wechsler, 2009), has been followed by additional
recent reports that support face recognition’s
speciﬁcity (Dennett et al., 2012; Hildebrandt
et al., 2011; McGugin et al., 2012; Wilhelm
et al., 2010; Wilmer et al., 2010). One particularly
extensive line of work developed several novel tests
of face recognition ability and provided evidence
that a latent variable deﬁned by the covariance
between them was stable, and quite distinct from
more general abilities, across the lifespan
(Herzmann et al., 2008; Hildebrandt, Sommer,
Herzmann, & Wilhelm, 2010; Hildebrandt
et al., 2011; Wilhelm et al., 2010). While the indi-
vidual tasks used in that study had neither the
reliability of CFMT nor its accumulated evidence
for validity, the structural equation modelling
(SEM) methods employed both enabled the cre-
ation of a reliable latent variable and provided
clear evidence for the validity of that variable.
Such SEM-based methods provide powerful
tools for investigating candidate speciﬁc abilities.
The present investigation was greatly acceler-
ated by the power of web-based testing. Indeed,
the large, 1,471-person data set that forms the
centrepiece of this paper was collected in largely
automated fashion over the course of just two
months via our popular website Testmybrain.org.
We believe web-based testing could play a key
role in the investigation of speciﬁc abilities and,
more broadly, in the translation of basic science
insights into a richer understanding of both clini-
cal and nonclinical human variation. In particular,
we advocate a participant-as-collaborator model of
web-based testing. This approach provides infor-
mative performance feedback to those who com-
plete tests and uses the knowledge gained from
participants to develop better tests that could
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2012, 29 (5–6) 389
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standing of themselves. The present investigation
provides an example of this approach. The large
number of participants who completed our tests
were self-selected, unsupervised, anonymous, and
uncompensated. They presumably completed
these tests mainly to gain knowledge about their
own memory, and the data they provided have
fuelled a substantial leap forward in the develop-
ment of the tests they took. Thus, by facilitating
both the public’s and science’s respective searches
for knowledge, the participant-as-collaborator
model of web testing could accelerate the test
development efforts necessary for a fuller under-
standing of what makes each individual unique.
In sum, we have provided clear evidence for face
recognition’s speciﬁcity, facilitated its precise and
efﬁcient measurement in individuals, and used it
as a test case to illustrate ﬁve test development cri-
teria that we believe could have broad utility in
further efforts to isolate and measure speciﬁc abil-
ities. To paraphrase A. A. Milne, the things that
make us different are the things that make us.
May we gain, over time, a deeper sense of the
things that make us.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available via the
“Supplementary” tab on the article’s online page
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2012.753433).
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